Vulnerability Assessment and Presentation Attack Detection Using a Set of Distinct Finger Vein Recognition Algorithms

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The Presentation Attack Problem




Figure: Block diagram visualisation of presentation attack problem

This Talk

- 3 Finger vein attack data sets
 - Paris Lodron University of Salzburg Finger Vein Spoofing Data Set (PLUS-LED and PLUS-Laser) [1]
 - The Idiap Research Institute VERA Fingervein Database (IDIAP VERA) [2]
 - South China University of Technology Spoofing Finger Vein Database (SCUT-SFVD) [3]
- Extensive threat analysis using 12 finger vein recognition schemes
- Presentation attack detection by fusion of similarity scores

Metrics

False Match Rate (FMR)

$$FMR = \frac{accepted\ impostor\ attempts}{all\ impostor\ attempts}$$

False Non Match Rate (FNMR)

$$FNMR = \frac{denied\ genuine\ attempts}{all\ genuine\ attempts}$$


Equal Error Rate (EER)

$$EER = Operating point where FMR = FNMR$$

■ Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate (IAPMR)

$$IAPMR = \frac{accepted\ attack\ attempts}{all\ attack\ attempts}$$

Threat Analysis Evaluation Protocol




Finger Subject A

Finger Subject A

Finger Subject B

Figure: Step 1

Threat Analysis Evaluation Protocol







Figure: Step 2

Feature Extraction Algorithms

- Binarized Vessel Network
 - Maximum Curvature (MC) [4]
 - Principal Curvature (PC) [5]
 - Wide Line Detector (WLD) [6]
 - Repeated Line Tracking (RLT) [7]
 - Gabor Filters (GF) [8]
 - Isotropic Undecimated Wavelet Transform (IUWT) [9]
 - Anatomy Structure Analysis-Based Vein Extraction (ASAVE) [10]


Figure: Binarized Vessel Networks





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- Keypoints
 - Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) based [11]
 - Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) based [11]
 - Deformation Tolerant Feature Point Matching (DTFPM) [12]

Figure: Keypoints







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- Keypoints
 - Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) based [11]
 - Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) based [11]
 - Deformation Tolerant Feature Point Matching (DTFPM) [12]
- Texture
 - Local Binary Pattern & Histogram Intersection (LBP) [13]
 - Convolutional Neural Network trained using triplet loss (CNN) [14] ¹

¹Everything except CNN used matching implementation from OpenVein-Toolkit [15]

PLUS-LED and PLUS-Laser Generation [1]




Figure: Presentation Attack generation from [1].

Threat Analysis: PLUS-LED and PLUS-Laser




Figure: Results IAPMR PLUS LED and Laser

IDIAP VERA Generation




Figure: Presentation Attack generation flow diagram (screenshot from Tome et al. [2]) IDIAP database.

Threat Analysis: IDIAP VERA




Figure: Results IAPMR IDIAP full and cropped

SCUT-SFVD Generation and Examples




Figure: Presentation Attack generation (screenshot from Qiu et al. [3]) SCUT-SFVD database.

Threat Analysis: SCUT-SFVD




Figure: Results IAPMR SCUT full and cropped

Threat Analysis: Overview




Figure: Overview IAPMRs; one case of every DB

Similarity Score Fusion Strategies

Sum-Rule Fusion

$$f = \sum_{i=1}^{N} S_i \tag{1}$$

Min-Rule Fusion

$$f = \min(S_1, ..., S_N) \tag{2}$$

Max-Rule Fusion

$$f = max(S_1, ..., S_N)$$
 (3)

Support Vector Machine with linear and rbf kernel

$$\vec{x} = (S_1, ..., S_N)$$
 (4)

f ... fusioned score, S_i ... similarity score of recognition scheme i

Score Normalisation

no-norm

z-norm

$$S' = \frac{S - \mu}{\sigma} \tag{6}$$

■ tanh-norm

$$S' = 0.5 * \left(\tanh \left(0.01 * \frac{S - \mu}{\sigma} \right) + 1 \right) \tag{7}$$

Spoof Detection Metrics

Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)

$$APCER = \frac{spoof\ attempts\ classified\ as\ real\ finger\ attempts}{all\ spoof\ attempts}$$

Bona Fide Presnetation Classification Error Rate (BPCER)

$$BPCER = \frac{real \ finger \ attmepts \ classified \ as \ spoof}{all \ real \ finger \ attempts}$$

Detection - Equal Error Rate (D-EER)

$$D - EER = Point where APCER = BPCER$$

Best Reuslts

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Database	0,	\(\psi_{1/2}\)	40,	4	5 8	2 4	× 4	×. Q	17,4	5, Q) · · · · · ·	y 6	, 4	is ciz
IDIAP VERA full	1.67	svm-lin	z-norm			✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IDIAP VERA cropped	4.02	svm-lin	z-norm		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
SCUT-SFVD full	0.75	svm-rbf	z-norm	✓		✓	✓	✓	\checkmark	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SCUT-SFVD roi-resized	1.09	svm-rbf	tanh-norm		✓		✓		✓		1	√	√	√
PLUS-LED thick	0.00	svm-rbf	z-norm									1		1
PLUS-LED thin	0.00	svm-lin	tanh-norm								1		~	
PLUS-Laser thick	0.00	svm-lin	z-norm									N YO		Át.
PLUS-Laser thin	0.00	svm-lin	z-norm		✓					1		V		HII.

Table: Selection of best working method constellations in terms of D-EER

Conclusion

Summary:

3 FV attack datasets were tested on threat they pose to 12 recognition algorithms; Similarity scores of matching experiments were used for score level fusion to achieve spoof detection.

Lessons learned:

- Every evaluated data sets poses a threat to at least some recognition schemes. However SURF seems to be overall very resistant to spoofing.
- We can combine similarity scores of different recognition schemes to achieve spoof detection (at least to some degree).

Thank you for your attention!

Thank You! Q & A

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